The Right of a Criminal Defense Attorney to
Withhold Physical Evidence Received
from His Client
I.

INTRODUCION

Several trials of the past year have raised serious questions concerning
the conduct of attorneys. While courtroom behavior has received the
most publicity,1 questions concerning the out-of-court actions of an attorney on behalf of his client have also been raised. Early this year, a
Chicago attorney representing members of the Black Panther Party
was found in contempt of court for failure to respond to a subpoena
duces tecum to produce certain physical evidence directly related to an
incident in which his clients were involved.2 This comment will consider the general duty of an attorney who receives from a client, directly or indirectly, physical evidence related to the commission of a
crime. 3 Two alternatives exist: (1) the attorney may, under all circumstances, retain possession of such evidence; or (2) he may be under a
1 Many, if not most, of the issues raised by these trials have been discussed, in some
cases ad nauseam, in both the public and academic presses.
2 Two members of the Black Panther Party were killed in a "shootout" with police in
December, 1969. A Close Look at "Black Panther" Shootouts, U.S. NEws & W. REP'., Dec.
22, 1969, at 25. The evidence, desired by a coroner's jury and a grand jury to determine
whether police or Panthers shot first, included a door panel, four mattresses, two box
springs, a window shutter, a window and frame, and three boxes of evidence, presumably
containing spent cartridges, slugs, shotgun pellets, pieces of wood and plaster, and so on.

Subpoena Duces Tecum (copy) in Record, People ex rel. Andrews v. Woods, No. 42863
(Sup. Ct. Ill., Jan. 17, 1970) (typescript, no pagination); O'Brian, Panther Lawyer Gives
Up Evidence, Avoids Jail, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 20, 1970, at 7. The attorney was released
on a habeas corpus petition to the Illinois Supreme Court on condition that he produce

the evidence two days later. Id. The habeas corpus petition alleged denial of the right
to counsel at a contempt hearing on the subpoena, and did not speak to the merits of
the withholding issue. Since the evidence was produced, the issue became moot. Order
of Justice Walter V. Schaefer in Record, People ex rel. Andrews v. Woods, supra. The
attorney originally withheld the evidence on the grounds that police would change
their testimony if he produced it before police testimony was concluded. O'Brian,
PantherLawyer Refuses to Testify, He's Jailed 30 Days, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 17, 1970,
at 7.
8 The evidence in the Panther case was in the hands of police, in that they guarded
the apartment and its contents until their investigation was completed. Thus it never was
a part of the "confidential" attorney-client relationship and hence is outside the topic
as discussed herein. It is elementary in consideration of the attorney-client privilege that
if a third party hears a conversation it is not confidential and therefore not privileged.
The same reasoning would apply a fortiori to physical evidence.
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duty to produce such evidence voluntarily and hence may be subject
to compulsory process if he fails to produce it.A criminal defendant cannot be compelled to produce the weapons
used for the commission of a crime or the fruits of a crime because he
is protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.5 The reasoning
behind this rule usually asserts that if he were compelled to produce
the physical evidence he would be "testifying" that the item produced
is the item demanded." The prosecution may, however, obtain the evidence through the use of a search warrant This is not "testimonial"
on the defendant's part because the prosecution must prove his connection with the item produced. To compel the defendant's attorney
to produce the evidence would, seemingly, be similar to compelling the
client to testify. A collateral effect of such forced production might involve effectively denying the right to counsel 8 by inhibiting the defen4 A third alternative exists: the attorney may be entitled to retain the evidence unless
ordered to produce it. This alternative does not seem a viable one, however, since it
would almost certainly result in routine subpoenas duces tecum for attorneys to produce
evidence. Thus, this comment considers the situation in an either/or context. Either he
may retain the evidence under all circumstances or he must produce it under all
circumstances.
5 See 8 J.H. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2264 (J.T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE]: "(1) It follows that the production of documents or chattels by a
person ( ... ) in response to a subpoena [or other process] relying on his moral responsibility for truthtelling, may be refused under the protection of the [self-incrimination]
privilege. This is universally conceded. For though the documents or chattels thus sought
be not oral in form, and though they be already in existence and not desired to be first
written and created by a testimonial act or utterance of the person in response to the
process, still there is testimonial disclosure implicit in their production. It is the witness'
assurance, compelled as an incident of the process, that the articles produced are the
ones demanded .... Testimonial acts of this sort-authenticating or vouching for preexisting chattels-are not typical of the sort of disclosures which are caught in the main
current of history and sentiments giving vitality to the [self-incrimination] privilege. Yet
they are within the border of its protection."
6 Id.
T 8 WIGMORE § 2264: "(2) Furthermore, it follows that documents or chattels obtained

from the person's control without the use against him of process relying on his truthtelling are not within the scope of the [self-incrimination] privilege. As Mr. Justice
Holmes said, 'A party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its
production.' [Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913)]. . . . Obviously, the
proof of their authenticity, or other circumstances affecting them, may and must be

made by the testimony of other persons, without any employment of the accused's oath
or testimonial responsibility. This distinction is illustrated in a variety of applications
to documents and chattels obtained by search and seizure independent of testimonial

process ...

."

This comment does not deal with any evidence of a nature which cannot

be seized by search warrant, since the problem herein defined is absent in such a situation.
See discussion in Harris v. United States, 331 US. 145, 154 (1947) (Vinson, C.J.), overruled
as to particular issue of law decided, Chimel v. California, 395 US. 768 (1969). See also
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
8 E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the landmark "right-to-counsel"
case which has spawned many other cases.
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dant from confiding in his attorney. By producing information against
his client, the attorney would become an advocate against his own client,9 a role the legal profession has long resisted. On the other hand,
the legal profession, for just as long a time, has considered its members
to be officers of the court, owing a duty to the court as well as to the
client. To permit the withholding of physical evidence-which may in
many cases preclude the prosecution from getting the evidence at all' 0
-seems to contradict the lawyer's duty to the court.
This comment relies on an implicit premise which should be made
explicit: Attorneys should not be subjected to a physical search
with respect to every criminal case in which the prosecution has
not found a piece of relevant physical evidence. Either the attorney
should be permitted to withhold the evidence or he should be
obligated to produce it. Such obligation, if imposed, should be enforced by the contempt power after issuance of a subpoena to produce, not by a search warrant. The resolution of the problem posed
herein requires a balancing of the interests of the defendant-his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, his right to counsel, and the evidentiary privilege against divulgence of confidential
attorney-client communication-with the interest of society in protecting its members through the apprehension and conviction of those
who commit crimes.
There is little case law to aid in resolving this problem. While one
would suppose the issue would arise frequently in criminal prosecutions," it apparently has not-either because the attorney willingly
turns over the evidence,'12 or because he refuses to accept it from his
client in the first place.'8 However, the attorney's refusal to accept evidence is a strong indication to the client that he should destroy it,14
9 "The client is presumed innocent, and it seems inconsistent with this premise that
the lawyer could be required in a criminal case to present evidence of guilt while at the
same time asserting innocence." Comment, An Attorney in Possession of Evidence In.
criminating His Client, 25 WAss. & La L. R v. 133, 136 (1968).
10 Oral evidence can thus be distinguished from physical evidence, since the prosecution
often has other possible ways of getting the facts which a defendant tells his lawyer,
while, once the lawyer has the physical evidence, there is no -other way for the prosecution
to get it.
i Comment, supra note 9, at 135.
12 The Ethics Committee of the New York County Lawyer's Association was asked if
it had an opinion on the issue or any authority on point. The chairman replied, "I
would suspect that such action on the part of a lawyer would be so clearly improper
that no lawyer would think of seeking a ruling on the matter from an Ethics Committee." Reported in Comment, Fruits of the Attorney-Client Privilege: Incriminating Evidence and Conflicting Duties, 3 DUQUESNE L. R-v. 239, 248 (1965).
18 There is a third alternative-that the lawyer keeps the evidence and the prosecution
never finds out that he has it, thereby avoiding the question entirely.
14 Comment, supra note 12, at 249.
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thus raising a different ethical question which is beyond the scope of
this comment. This comment will consider: (1) whether it is appropriate to consider the withholding of physical evidence by an attorney as
an ethical question under the Canons of Professional Ethics and its replacement, the Code of Professional Responsibility;1 5 (2) whether it is
appropriate to consider whether the conduct of the lawyer in withholding physical evidence is itself a criminal act; and (3) whether, as a matter of legal policy, the evidentiary privilege against divulgence of confidential communications between an attorney and his client should
permit the attorney to withhold physical evidence, the decision being
based on an analysis of the benefits gained from exclusion versus the
benefits expected from requiring production. 6
II. Ti

ETHICAL ANALYSis

Some courts insist on discussing the Canons of Professional Ethics
in their opinions, 17 though basing a conclusion thereon undoubtedly
involves the logical fallacy of petitio principii or "begging the question." ' Cited in support of the proposition that the ABA Canons
would require the attorney to withhold the evidence are the "undivided fidelity" requirement of Canon 6,19 the requirement of Canon 15
that "[t]he lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the interest of the client
2
". and the duty to preserve a client's confidences of Canon 37. 1
. , ,"20
15 While the Code has now replaced the Canons as the ABA's ethical standard, some
jurisdictions have their own standards based on the Canons which may not as yet have
been revised to conform to the Code. Thus, consideration of both seems appropriate.
16 E.g., 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 276 (1957): "In order for the privilege to apply, the resultant injury to the relation of attorney and client by the disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the
litigation." Cases cited id. at n.60.
17 E.g., In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967)
(per curiam). For an ethical approach without mention of the Canons, see Clark v. State,
159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339, cert. denied, 346 US. 855, rehearing denied, 346 U.S.
905 (1953). In Ryder the issue was indeed whether the attorney had breached the Virginia
Canons of Ethics (same as ABA Canons), but the actual decision rested on a determination that the conduct involved was not within the attorney-client evidentiary privilegeclearly not an ethical question in itself. See further discussion of the case in text at notes
39-52 infra. In Clark, a telephone operator was permitted to testify to a conversation
wherein an attorney told his client to get rid of the murder weapon. The court decided
such conduct was not within the attorney-client privilege. See text at notes 63-67 infra.
18 I.M. CoPI, INTRODUcrION TO LOGIC 65, 66 (2d ed. 1961).
19 ABA CANONS OF PROFisoNAL ETHICS No. 6 [hereinafter cited as ABA CANONS]:
"The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his
secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment
from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which
confidence has been reposed."
20 ABA CANONS No. 15 (in full):
How Far a Lawyer May Go in Supporting a Client's Cause.
Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against
lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public
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On the other hand, the proposition that the attorney should not withhold the evidence is supported by Canon 5, prohibiting the prosecution from withholding evidence of a defendant's innocence, 22 Canon 22
calling for an attitude of "candor and fairness" to the court,2 3 Canon 29
esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than
does the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable

transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to
succeed in winning his client's cause.

It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his

client's innocence or in the justice of his cause.
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the
rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity
should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum

the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every

such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great
trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the
law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for
any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicane. He must obey his
own conscience and not that of his client.
See In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 369 (1967): "He [Ryder] allowed the office of attorney
to be used in violation of law. The scheme which he devised was a deceptive, legalistic
subterfuge-rightfully denounced by the canon as chicane."
21 ABA CANONS No. 37 (in full):
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts
the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employees; and neither of
them should accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure
or use of these confidences, either for the private advantage of the lawyer or his
employees or to the disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge and
consent, and even though there are other available sources of such information.
A lawyer should not continue employment when he discovers that this obligation
prevents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client.
If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from disclosing the
truth in respect to the accusation. The announced intention of a client to commit
a crime is not included within the confidences which he is bound to respect. He
may properly make such disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act or
protect those against whom it is threatened.
22 ABA CANONS No. 5: "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution
is not to convict, but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting
of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible."
The argument is by analogy but is weak because the prosecutor's role differs from that
of the usual advocate:
The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate;
his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special duty exists because:
(1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore should use restraint in
the discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in the selection of
cases to prosecute; (2) during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he
also may make decisions normally made by an individual client, and those
affecting the public interest should be fair to all; and (3)in our system of criminal
justice the accused is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts. With
respect to evidence and witnesses, the prosecutor has responsibilities different from
those of a lawyer in private practice: the prosecutor should make timely disclosure
to the defense of available evidence, known to him, that tends to negate the guilt
of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment.
Further, a prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely
because he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid the accused.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY Canon 7, § EC 7-13 (effective Jan. 1, 1970).
23 ABA CANONS No. 22: "The conduct of the lawyer before the Court and with other
lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness." A lawyer must divulge decisions
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requiring exposure of perjury,24 Canon 32 saying that no client should
be given service or advice involving disloyalty to the law, 25 and Canon 41
2
forbidding fraud or deception.
In interpreting the Canons, the Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics has written that "we do not consider that either the
duty of candor and fairness to the court as stated in Canon 22 or the
provisions of Canons 29 and 41 ...are sufficient to override the purposes, policy and express obligations under Canon 37."27 The Committee
therefore decided that an attorney who obtained a divorce for a client
should not reveal the truth to the court when the client informs him
that he committed perjury in securing the divorce, but rather should
advise the client to inform the court and cease representation if the
client fails to do so.

28

The courts may not be so lenient:

We cannot permit a member of the bar to exonerate himself from a failure to disclose known perjury by a self-serving
statement that in his judgment he had a duty of non-disclosure so as to protect his client which is paramount to his duty
to disclose the same to the court, of which he is an officer, and
to which he in fact, owes a primary duty....29
The Bar Committee also said that if an attorney learned of a client's
previous criminal record through confidential communication, he need
not inform the court even though the client is given a lesser sentence
contrary to his client's case if his adversary fails to do so. ABA Comur. ON PROFEssIONAL
ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 280 (1949), No. 146 (1985) [hereinafter cited as ABA OPINIONS].
24 ABA CANONS No. 29: "The counsel upon the trial of a cause in which perjury has
been committed owe it to the profession and to the public to bring the matter to the
knowledge of the prosecuting authorities." See generally Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, in Symposium
on ProfessionalEthics, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966).
25 ABA CANONS No. 82:

No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil or
political, however important, is entitled to receive nor should any lawyer render
any service or advice involving disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are, or
disrespect of the judicial office, which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of
any person or persons exercising a public office or private trust, or deception or
betrayal of the public. When rendering any such improper service or advice, the
lawyer invites and merits stern and just condemnation.
26 ABA CANONS No. 41 (in full):
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced,
which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he should endeavor to
rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if his client refuses to forego the
advantage thus unjustly gained, he should promptly inform the injured person
or his counsel, so that they may take appropriate steps.
27 ABA OPINIONS No. 280 (1949). But cf., e.g., Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261
S.W.2d 839, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855, rehearing denied, 846 U.S. 905 (1953).
28 ABA OPINIONS No. 287 (1953). Contra, In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 322 P.2d 1095
(1958).
29 In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 262, 822 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1958).
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because the court did not know of the prior conviction.8 0 The committee nevertheless noted that the lawyer's duty to the court involved more
than merely respect for the judicial office and candor and frankness to
the judge:
It involves also the steadfast maintenance of the principles
which the courts themselves have evolved for the effective administration of justice, one of the most firmly established of
comwhich is the preservation undisclosed of the confidences
31
municated to the lawyer in his professional capacity.
The Committee appears to be saying that if the information is privileged as a matter of 1aw 3 2 -not ethics-then disclosure would be unethical.
It is obvious that if the law requires disclosure, it is not unethical to
disclose, and the Canons recognize this. For example, Canon 5 provides: "the lawyer is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present
every defense that the law of the land permits ... ."33 Likewise, Canon
15 requires devotion and zeal "to the end that nothing be taken or be
34
withheld from [the client] save by the rules of law, legally applied."
It is also generally recognized that a lawyer may not hold in confidence
a client's intent to commit a crime, fraudulent act or tort; only the client's communications with respect to previous crimes are protected.3 5
30 ABA OPINIONS No.

287 (1953).
81 Id.
32 "The canon, however, does not purport to state the law governing the attorney-

client privilege." NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 906 (4th Cir. 1965). Whether communications between an insured and the insurer's attorney regarding a case of potential
liability are privileged is a question of law and not a question of ethics. ABA OPINIONS No.
247 (1942); H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 132 (1953). In an informal opinion the ABA unit
did say, "An attorney should refuse to disclose a privileged communication though the
court send him to jail," but this does not make clear whether he should do so pending
appeal or forever forbear from disclosure. Informal Opinion 317, reported in ABA
OPINIONS (1957 ed.).
33 ABA CANONS No. 5 (emphasis supplied).
It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person accused of
crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise
innocent persons, victims only of suspicious circumstances, might be denied
proper defense. Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound, by all fair
and honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land permits,
to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process
of law. Id.
34 ABA CANONS No. 15 (emphasis supplied). The Canon is set forth in note 20 supra.
85 Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891), citing Regina v. Cox, 14 Q.B.D.
162 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1884); In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 364 (E.D. Va.), aJ'd, 381 F.2d
718 (4th Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 199, 261 S.W.2d 339,
347, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 905 (1953); 8 WIGMORE § 2298;
E. MORGAN, BAsIc PROBLEMS OF EvIDENCE 104 (1954); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 212

(1942); UNIFORM RULES OF EvIDENCE 26(2); ABA CANONS No. 37, supra note 21; ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE' oNsILrrY Canon 4, § DR 4-101(C)(3).
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The newly promulgated Code of Professional Responsibility, which
replaced the Canons effective January, 1970, makes it indisputably clear
that the issue is really one of law, not of ethics. While noting that the
attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation to
maintain confidences,8 6 the Code's Disciplinary Rules provide that a
lawyer may reveal:
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit8 7a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.
More explicitly,
Because it interferes with the proper administration of justice, a lawyer should not suppress evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce.38
The Disciplinary Rules provide:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: ...
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.3 9
It thus seems clear that the real issue is a legal question of the scope
of the evidentiary attorney-client privilege. Any attempt to frame it in
terms of the ethical considerations falls prey to the fallacy of petitio
principii.
III. LEGALrrY oF CONDUCt APPROACH
40
One approach, that apparently taken by the court in In re Ryder,
analyzes the attorney's conduct to determine whether he is violating a
criminal law (such as a law prohibiting aiding and abetting), but then
punishes him, not for violating the law, but for unethical conduct.
This approach also seems to involve the logical fallacy of begging
the question. A determination that the conduct is outside "proper"
conduct for an attorney or outside the attorney-client privilege is a prerequisite for the conduct to be criminal, because, if within the privilege, the conduct is ipso facto legal. In Ryder, the client had consulted
his attorney after committing a robbery. The client had secreted the
30 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmxLITY Canon 4, § EC 4-4. Confidences, of course,
should be maintainled even apart from official proceedings.
87 Id. at § DR 4-101(C).
38 Id. at Canon 7, § EC 7-27.
89 Id. at § DR 7-102.
40 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 281 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
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fruits of the crime-stolen money, together with a sawed-off shotgun-in
a safety deposit box. Ryder, the attorney, armed with a power of attorney properly executed by his client, but on his own initiative, removed
the money and sawed-off shotgun and placed them in a safety deposit
box in his own name, allegedly intending to return the stolen money.
When the F.B.I. discovered the boxes and their contents, charges of
unprofessional conduct were brought against Ryder, and he was suspended from practice before the federal district court. The court
ruled, 41 and the ruling was sustained on appeal, 42 that such conduct
was beyond the bounds of legitimate professional conduct-a violation
of Canon 32 43-and that receiving stolen money and a sawed-off shotgun were crimes in themselves.44 The Ryder court only censured those
acts as unprofessional conduct; it passed over the question whether the
acts should be criminally punished. The opinion stresses the fact that
the weapon was a sawed-off shotgun, possession of which is prohibited
by federal law. 45 It is by no means clear that, had the weapon itself been
"legal," the court would still have taken disciplinary action against
Ryder for secreting evidence. The court also stressed the fact that Ryder
took possession of his own initiative:
It was Ryder, not his client, who took the initiative in transferring the incriminating possession of the stolen money and
the shotgun from [the client]. Ryder's conduct went far beyond the receipt and46 retention of a confidential communication from his client.
Thus, there is a possibility that the court might have treated the case
differently had the client brought the money and the weapon to the
attorney's office.
The Ryder opinion seems to contain a superficial analysis based on
indignation rather than a reasoned examination of the problem. One
could argue in favor of permitting the lawyer to retain physical evidence given to him by a client but oppose such withholding if the lawyer takes the initiative in obtaining the evidence. 47 However, if the atat 365, 369.
42 381 F.2d at 713, 714.
43 Note 25 supra.
44 263 F. Supp. at 369.
45 Id.; 28 US.C. § 5851 (1964).
46 263 F. Supp. at 365.
47 The Ryder case presents an example of a situation where the attorney was
"searched," since the F.B.I. had obtained the evidence from the second safety deposit box.
The preferable approach would have been for the authorities to have ordered Ryder to
produce the evidence after they had information concerning the transfer from the
defendant's box to the attorney's.
41 Id.
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torney-client privilege is meant to give the client an assurance that he
can confide in his attorney without fear, 48 and if the withholding of
physical evidence is to be justified on the grounds that such evidence
is as essential for the proper preparation of the client's defense 49 as are
oral communications, then it would be incongruous to permit the attorney to elicit oral information from his client but to prohibit him
from soliciting information in the form of physical evidence. If an attorney obtained physical evidence in the ordinary course of his investigation, it would not, of course, be protected by the privilege, just as
oral evidence that is gained from third persons in the course of an
investigation is ordinarily not so protected. 50 However, where the physical evidence is received as a direct result of confidential communications,51 there is no logical reason why it should matter whether it was
proffered as a result of the client's or the attorney's initiative.
The Ryder court's emphasis on the attorney's violation of substantive law is not particularly enlightening. The Model Penal Code considers one guilty of misdemeanor if he "conceals or removes any record,
document or thing with purpose to impair its verity or availability in
[an official] proceeding or investigation." 52 Thus, since the attorney's
retention of any physical evidence or of a document would be unlawful, he could never withhold. However, it is a well-settled principle
that an attorney may withhold his client's documents, 53 such as confidential written communications from the client to the attorney, and it
is generally recognized that the attorney may withhold any pre-existing
document 54 that the client could have refused to produce. 55 Just as
the attorney's act in advising generally is not considered "aiding and
abetting," 6 so too his possession of a document under the stated cir48 Text at note 76 inlra.
49 State ex rel. Sowers v. OIwell,
50 8 WIGMORE § 2317. See State

64 Wash. 2d 828, 838-34, 394 P.2d 681, 684 (1964).
ex rel. Sowers v. Olwel, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 831, 894

P.2d 681, 683 (1964).
51 See State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 831, 894 P.2d 681, 688 (1964).
52 MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
53 8 WIoMoE § 2307(2), at 594. Temporary possesion only for preparation of defense
would not, of course, be an illegal "purpose" under the Model Penal Code.
54 Generally a document existing before the formation of an attorney-client relationship.
55 See generally 8 WIGMoRE § 2307; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 93 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCormiCK]; Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran
Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Cm. L. Rv. 687 (1951); Note,
The Attorney and His Client's Privileges, 74 YALE L.J. 539 (1965).

56 If the attorney is consulted after the commission of a crime and not during a
continuing crime, his advice to his client is protected by the privilege. See generally
authorities cited note 85 supra. If the court deems the advice "unprofessional" then it
may well consider it unlawful. See the discussion of the Clark case in text at notes 63-67
infra.
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cumstances is not considered a violation of the law. 57 Likewise his
possession of a chattel should not be considered illegal.
Wigmore suggests that the pre-existing document rule arises from
the client's privilege against self-incrimination and from the agency
status held by his attorney rather than directly from the attorney-client
privilege.5 8 Although the privilege is usually thought personal to the
client, 59 one court 0 permitted the attorney to claim the client's self-incrimination privilege, with respect to documents given to the attorney
which the client could not have been compelled to produce and which
could not have been obtained through a valid search. The court apparently rejected the attorney-client privilege as grounds for its decision
because some of the documents were canceled checks, documents which
could not be deemed confidential when written,61 and therefore would
not meet the intent of confidentiality requirement of the attorney-client privilege in general.6 2 With respect to the type of evidence being
discussed herein, the self-incrimination privilege is not as conclusive
as it is with respect to documents, because the evidence being consid63
ered here can be obtained by a valid search if kept by the client.
In the present situation, as in the documents situation, to argue that
the attorney's action is in violation of substantive law, such as "possession" statutes or the Model Penal Code provision, is to beg the question. It must first be determined whether the conduct is privileged as
a matter of law, and, if so, whether it is within well-recognized exceptions to the criminal statute. The logical fallacy of begging the question is exhibited in Clark v. State.6 4 A telephone operator was permitted to testify to a conversation between a client and an attorney
wherein the attorney advised his client to get rid of a murder weapon.
The court said that the attorney's advice was beyond the bounds of legitimate professional conduct and therefore was not protected by the
attorney-client privilege.6 5
57 See authorities cited note 55 supra.
58 8 WIGMOa E § 2307.
59 Id. § 2270.
(0 United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). The OlweU court rejected
this argument. 64 Wash. 2d at 834-36, 394 P.2d at 685-86. See also Note, supra note 55.
61 United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1963). See Note, supra note 55.

62 See note 82 infra.
03 Even the document rule may not be as conclusive as it once was. See, e.g., Lipton,
Search Warrant in Tax Fraud Investigations, 56 A.B.A.J. 941 (1970).
64 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855, rehearing denied, 346

US. 905 (1953).
65 Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 199-200, 261 S.W.2d 339, 347, cert. denied, 346
U.S. 855, rehearingdenied, 346 U.S. 905 (1953).
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In discussing the illegality of the attorney's conduct, the court wrote:
One who knowing that an offense has been committed conceals the offender or aids him to evade arrest or trial becomes
an accessory. The fact that the aider may be a member of the
bar and the attorney for the offender will not prevent his becoming an accessory.
Art. 77, P.C. defining an accessory contains the exception
"One who aids an offender in making or preparing his defense at law" is not an accessory.
The conversation as testified to by the telephone operator
is not within the exception found in Art. 77, P.C. When the
Dallas voice [the attorney] advised the client to "get rid of the
weapon" (which advice the evidence shows was followed) such
aid cannot be said to constitute aid "in making and preparing
his defense at law." It was aid to the perpetrator of the crime
"in order that he may evade an arrest and trial."0 6
First, the statute specifically excepted the attorney even if he did "aid
to evade arrest and trial." Certainly destruction of the murder weapon
is an aid to the client's defense at law, or perhaps the court deems the
seriousness of the offense as affecting the scope of the legally permitted "aid." If advising the client to destroy the weapon is not within
the attorney exception, then what "aid to evade arrest or trial" is to be
considered within the exception for preparing a defense at law? Some
such aid must be permitted or the attorney exception would be unnecessary. Thus, one must first determine the scope of the attorney-client
privilege; then, ipso facto, anything outside that scope is unlawful,
though it may well be punished only as unprofessional conduct, and
not as a crime. Properly viewed, the Clark court's opinion really did
nothing more than rule that the conversation was not protected by the
attorney-client privilege because public policy dictated that such conduct should not be permitted in preparing a defense at law. Once having made that determination, the action was of course a violation of
the statute. The point is, any conduct which the court deems to be
properly undertaken by the attorney would be within the exception,
even if it involves aiding in evading arrest or trial. The court determined the propriety of the conduct on public policy grounds apart
from the statute and only then did it apply the statute to reinforce its
argument.
In Ryder, had the court concluded that possession of the money and
gun were within the attorney-client privilege, it could have ruled that
the statute did not apply, just as the Model Penal Code provision obvi60 Id.
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ously does not apply, as illustrated above, to documents. True, the analogy to documents 67 may not be as appropriate with reference to the
stolen money as to the shotgun. It is sometimes said, with respect to
documents, that if someone other than the client had a superior right
to possession of the document 6 s or chattel,6 9 then the client cannot refuse to produce it even if the production is incriminating. If the client
could be compelled to produce, then the attorney could not refuse under the analysis of the documents rule.70 It could be argued that a client could not "give" his attorney stolen property because he had no
title and hence no right to pass title.71 But, if it is admitted, and it
would be difficult to argue otherwise, that an attorney would have to
surrender the stolen property to its rightful owner after his client's
trial, then the title point seems inconclusive. He could simply be constructive trustee for the owner. If the property is going to serve as evidence, the owner is not likely to regain possession until after the trial
anyway.7 2
Thus, the legality of conduct approach, just like the ethical approach,
is question begging. The solution must come from policy considerations, and for these, the background of the attorney-client privilege
should be examined.
IV.

RATIONALE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The common law attorney-client privilege can be traced to the reign
of Elizabeth I, when it was utilized in order to protect the oath and
honor of the attorney-to protect his pledge of secrecy at a time when
67

Text at notes 52-62 supra.
68 MODEL CODE OF EviDENcE rule 206 (1942).
69 Id.
70 8 WIGMORE § 2307.
71 The Model Code of Evidence rule 206 uses an analysis similar to the "title"
analysis in requiring production of incriminating documents or chattels by the possessor
if someone else has a superior right to possession.
72 The document rule might be distinguished. Documents which belong to someone
else often take on their incriminating character apart from the client's use of them
while in his possession. The physical evidence being discussed herein has no significance
at all apart from the client's connection with and use of it. If a client murders someone
with another's gun, is there any doubt that he could not be compelled to produce the
weapon, even though it is a chattel belonging to another and apparently within the
Model Code of Evidence rule 206? Here the item took on its incriminating character in
the possession of the client because of his use of it. A client may possess a document
belonging to someone else and its contents may be incriminating, but the client's
possession of it does not make it any more incriminating. A document is incriminating
regardless of what the client does with it; the physical evidence takes on its incriminating
character solely by virtue of its connection with the client and his use of it. The
client's possession of a document owned by another is not likely to be the primary
incriminating factor-the content is likely to be so.
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the breach of such pledge by an attorney or anyone else was regarded
with public disfavor 73 "That doctrine, however, finally lost ground,
and by the last quarter of the 1700s ... was entirely repudiated. The
judicial search for truth could not endure to be obstructed by a voluntary pledge of secrecy, nor was there any moral delinquency or public
odium in breaking one's pledge under force of the law."" But the privilege remained, though with a rationale focusing more on the client
than on the attorney. 75 It was said to free the client from apprehension
in consulting his attorney.7 6 It has also been suggested that the purpose
of the privilege is to preserve the dignity of the individual and the in77
violate personality.
Whatever words are used, the reasoning is apparent. Laws, government regulations, and court rules-the system of government by laware too complex for the layman; he needs an expert spokesman, someone familiar with the "system" who can use that system to see that his
client receives justice.7 8 For an attorney adequately to fulfill his function, he must know all the facts of his client's case. The client will not
confide in his attorney if he thinks the information will be revealed
and used against him.7 9 On the other hand, there is no doubt that the
privilege keeps potentially important facts from the jury. Justice, it is
usually assumed, will best be served if all the facts are revealed and a
reasoned judgment is rendered based thereon. Professor Wigmore has
written, in regard to the privilege: "Its benefits are all indirect and
speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete."8 10 But, the privilege
has been praised. Professor McCormick writes: "The proposition is
that the detriment to justice from a power to shut off inquiry to perti73
74
75
78

8 WiG o E § 2290.

Id.

See Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826) (Story, J.).
State ex rel. Sowers v. Oh1ell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 832, 394 P.2d 681, 684 (1964): 8
WiOMoRE §§ 2290-91. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888), decree made
absolute, 131 U.S. 403 (1889); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 210, comment a at 146 (1942);
Morgan, Introduction in ALl, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 25 (1942).
77 Gardner, A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (pts. 1-2), 8 VimL. L. Rav.
279, 308, 316, 511-19 (1963).
78 Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888), decree made absolute, 131 US. 403
(1889); McCoRMIcK § 91; Morgan, supra note 76, at 25:
The orthodox justification for the present privilege stresses first the function of
the lawyer in the administration of justice. In a complex society such as ours, with
local legislative bodies, state legislatures and the United States Congress grinding
out statutes and regulations after various stages of deliberation or lack of deliberation, many ri-drawn, many with varying implications, there can be no question
of the need for trained technicians to advise men how to order their conduct.
And under rules of procedure developed by courts and legislatures, the impossibility of a layman's preparing and conducting a lawsuit needs no demonstration.
79 Morgan, supra note 76, at 26.
80 8 WiGMORE § 2291.
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nent facts in court, will be outweighed by the benefits to justice (not to
the client) from a franker disclosure in the lawyer's office.""'
Many of the commentators are less than totally enthusiastic about
the privilege. 2 McCormick says that it would be hard to argue, absent
the ingrained existence of the privilege as it is, that justice would be
any less served by permitting the judge, at his discretion, to admit previously privileged communication if he felt justice so required. 3 Presumably, however, McCormick would not permit admission of evidence, otherwise protected, such as a confession made to an attorney,
since such admission would surely conflict with the constitutionalright
to counsel and the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
Professor Morgan is also critical of the privilege and suggests that it
is included in the Model Code of Evidence only because it would be
politically impossible to abolish it.8 4 "There are," he writes, "no data
to furnish a reasoned support for the privilege in general."8 5 However, even Morgan recognizes that "[i]n situations where the privilege
against self-incrimination is involved, the retention of the privilege is
justified."8 8 He continues: "There the justification rests not on the attorney-client privilege but upon a combination of the privilege against
self-incrimination and the right of every person accused of crime to
competent counsel. ' 8 T A New Jersey court agrees: "The attorney-client
privilege is basic to a relation of trust and confidence that, though not
given express constitutional security, is yet essentially interrelated with
the specific constitutional guarantees of the individual's right to counsel and immunity from self-incrimination .... "8,s
Thus, whatever one may think of the privilege in such as civil cases
where modem discovery rules might affect one's assessment,8 9 the privilege remains justifiable in criminal cases, where it may be necessary
to effectuate the right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimi91 (emphasis added).
82 E.g., Morgan, supra note 76, at 25-28; McCoRMIcK § 91. See Radin, The Privilege of
Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALiF. L. REv. 487, 491-92
81 MCCORMICK §

(1928). The privilege, of course, is not unlimited. Its traditional statement is from
Wigmore, 8 WIGMORE § 2292: "(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection
be waived."
83 MCCORMICK § 91.
84 Morgan, supra note 76, at 26-28.
85 Id. at 27.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 State v. Kociolek, 23 NJ. 400, 415, 129 A.2d 417, 425 (1957).

89 Eg., FED. P. Cv. P. 26-37.
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nation. It is from this perspective-the conflicting duties and intereststhat the policy judgment must be made.
V.

TH.E POLICY ISSUE.

The policy issue may be stated simply: Do the benefits to justice
of complete divulgence of facts and objects related to a crime by a
client to his attorney, considering also the tangential support provided
by the client's right to counsel and privilege from self-incrimination,"
outweigh the benefits to justice of full disclosure of evidence? In upholding the protection of the privilege as to an alleged murder weapon,
the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Sowers v. Owe1191 noted that "[g]enerally speaking, the public interest at times must yield to protect the
individual. '9 2 In that case, a man accused of murder consulted an
attorney who came into possession of a knife alleged to have been
the murder weapon. The court was not dear on exactly how he got
possession, whether directly from the client or as a direct result of
the information supplied from the client. A subpoena duces tecum ordered the attorney to produce the weapon at a coroner's inquest. The
attorney refused to comply and was cited for contempt. The state
supreme court reversed on the grounds that the subpoena duces tecum
was "defective on its face" because it required an attorney to violate
the attorney-client privilege.03 The court decided that the attorney
could keep the weapon for a reasonable time to aid him in preparing
his client's defense9 4 and that he then should turn the weapon over to
the authorities on his own initiative. The court also noted that, with
respect to the evidence thus obtained from defense counsel, the prosecution would be required to exercise extreme caution in introducing
the evidence so that its source would not be revealed. 95
The Qiwell court may have been influenced by the fact that the attorney's client was convicted of murder96 and that the knife in the
attorney's possession turned out not to have been the murder weapon.97 Still, the court made it clear that it did not think the balancing
of interests would permit the attorney to withhold the evidence permanently, 98 and it indicated that the defense attorney should keep the
90 On the theory that the more these be viewed as promoting justice the more likely
one would perceive justice in the present attorney-client privilege context.
91 64 Wash. 2d 828, 594 P.2d 681 (1964).
92 Id. at 832, 394 P.2d at 684.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 833-34, 394 P.2d at 684-85.
95 Id. at 834, 394 P.2d at 685.
9 Id. at 830 n.1, 394 P.2d at 683.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 833, 394 P.2d at 684.
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weapon only as long as needed to aid in the preparation of his client's
defense"9 and should then surrender it voluntarily to the court.1'° The
court also indicated that after some such reasonable time compulsory
process for production might be in order, 01 even though the subpoena
10 2
duces tecum in the case itself was deemed "defective on its face"'
because it required production of items protected by the attorneyclient privilege. The Qiwell court apparently recognized the questionbegging nature of the ethical and criminality-of-conduct approaches
for it commendably used a policy approach. The court felt that the
purposes of the attorney-client privilege could best be served by requiring the prosecution, when introducing evidence obtained from
counsel, to refrain from divulging the source of the evidence.1'3 By
thus avoiding any connection with the client or attorney in a testimonial sense, as would result if either produced the evidence in response to a subpoena duces tecum, the client's communication with
his attorney is protected, but the state is given the same opportunity
to get the evidence as it would have had by use of a search warrant
if the items were still in the hands of the client. It is true that the
prosecution may never find the item even if it searches for it. In that
sense, the client's confidential disclosure is used to his detriment. 0 4
However, anytime there is a balancing of interests and a compromise
solution, it must be expected that neither interest will be protected
to the utmost degree.
If evidence were obtained by search warrant from the client's home,
connecting the evidence with the client would be a good deal easier
for the prosecution than would be the case if it got the evidence from
defense counsel with the stipulation that it must be introduced without reference to its source. This disadvantage could be said to be the
prosecution's concession in order to protect the client's interests while
not denying society the opportunity of having its courts consider all
relevant evidence in arriving at a verdict. But one should not overlook the problems the prosecution might have in attempting to introduce evidence without reference to its source. Even if it could be
connected to defendant by fingerprints or otherwise, serious questions
might arise in the jury's mind if the origin of a piece of critical evi99 Id. at

833-34, 394 P.2d at 684.
100 Id. at 834, 394 P.2d at 685.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 833, 394 P.2d at 684.

108 Id. at 834, 394 P.2d at 685.
104 See generally Freedman, supra note 24, and critical replies following his article:
Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MIcH. L RYV. at
1485; Bress, Professional Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel's Responsibility, id. at 1493.
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dence were not disclosed. In addition to this burden on the prosecution, the Olwell court also permitted the attorney to keep the evidence
for some length of time in order to aid him in preparing his client's
defense. 10 5 But such a privilege only raises additional questions: How
long? A reasonable time? What is reasonable? Given the requirement
placed on the prosecution in introducing this evidence, the only justification for permitting the attorney to keep the evidence at all is
that it might aid him in the preparation of his client's defense. That
purpose could be adequately served by requiring that the evidence
be promptly turned over to the authorities, while providing that the
attorney be entitled to repossession for such time as is required to aid
him in preparing his case.
In many cases "aid in preparation" may be nothing more than a
verbalism. Aside from aiding the client by destroying or refusing to
produce the evidence, the attorney's defense of his client may not
be greatly aided by possessing the evidence in the first place. If there
is no real substance to the "aid in preparation" concept, then the
Olwell solution holds essentially that the attorney must surrender the
physical evidence but that the prosecution will have to avoid introducing it in any way which might clothe it with "testimonial" representations of the defendant through his attorney. That requirement
effectively protects the client's self-incrimination privilege. It does not,
however, resolve the right-to-counsel problem insofar as the client would
be deterred from full disclosure and hence possibly be deemed to
have been denied effective assistance of counsel. This consideration is
of less importance if the observation made above-that such evidence
really is not of much help in the preparation of the defense-is correct.
In the final analysis, however, one must turn to first principles. The
purpose of the attorney-client privilege and the constitutional right
to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination is to protect the
innocent and not the guilty. If one could be sure an innocent man
would never be convicted, then all constitutional rights of criminals
-except those of a purely humane nature' 0 6-could be abandoned. But
105 Courts are not likely to allow the time of disclosure to be decided by counsel. The
attorney will not be permitted to "bide his time and decide himself when the disclosure should be made." In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 262, 322 P.2d 1095, 1098 (1958).
108 Historical analysis supports the view that the self-incrimination privilege itself was
founded on humane considerations-that it is unreasonable to subject a human being to
the dilemma of committing perjury or giving up his self-preservation. See, e.g., discussion
in Meltzer, supra note 55. This consideration seems more relevant to self-incrimination
in the sense of being forced to testify involuntarily than t6 the collateral self-incrimination
considerations involved herein. The "protection of the innocent" purpose stated in the
text is not meant to imply that this is the only purpose or justification for the rights
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since one cannot be sure, the rights of the accused must be maintained. Still, however, in considering what scope should be given to
existing privileges it is indeed appropriate to consider the risk that
a narrow scope will expose the innocent to punishment. There is little
chance that the refusal to expand the attorney-client privilege to protect the fruits or instrumentalities of a crime given to an attorney by
his client would operate to create a serious risk for the innocent. Discrepancies in ability of counsel would have far greater impact, yet the
right to counsel is not deemed denied as long as the counsel is reasonably competent.
and privileges. But in this author's opinion, the "risk to the innocent" approach seems
to be a legitimate contemporary criterion and has special merit in deciding issues of
scope such as the one discussed herein.

